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1. Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Mass. 1980) (quoting Robbins v. Jones,
[1863] 143 Eng. Rep. 768, 776 (N.S.)).
2. See Lavery v. Brigance, 1925 OK 702, 242 P. 239.
3. Caveat emptor is Latin for “Let the buyer beware.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 236
(8th ed. 2004).  In the context of landlord-tenant law, it is alternately referred to as caveat
lessee.  See, e.g., Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973).
4. Godbey v. Barton, 1939 OK 19, ¶ 5, 86 P.2d 621, 622.
5. See, e.g., Lavery, ¶ 2, 242 P. at 240 (describing how a landlord’s failure to plug a hole
in an uncapped gas pipe led to “an explosion of gas which burned [the tenant] badly, set the
house on fire, and damaged [the tenant’s] belongings”).
6. 2009 OK 49, ¶ 24, 212 P.3d 1223, 1230.
7. Id.
8. See id. ¶ 20, 212 P.3d at 1230 n.4 (listing court decisions overruling caveat emptor);
Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 21, 86 P.3d 270, 280 (Wyo. 2004) (noting that “forty-plus
states . . . have done away with landlord immunity”).
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NOTES
Oklahoma Landlords Beware: Miller v. David Grace, Inc.
Abandons Caveat Emptor in Residential Leases
“[T]here is no law against letting a tumble-down house.”1
I. Introduction
For many years, it was perfectly legal to lease a “tumble-down house” in
Oklahoma, because state law held that a residential landlord was immune from
tort suits initiated by tenants who had been injured by the leased premises.2
This common law theory of landlord tort immunity, known as caveat emptor,3
meant that once a tenant took possession of leased premises, she “assum[ed]
all risk of personal injury from defects therein,” and the landlord could not be
held responsible for the defective conditions.4  Caveat emptor denied tenant-
plaintiffs the opportunity to recover for often horrific injuries caused by the
negligence of their landlord.5 
As of June 30, 2009, these injustices became a thing of the past.  In Miller
v. David Grace, Inc.,6 the Oklahoma Supreme Court finally abandoned caveat
emptor as it pertains to residential leases.  The court replaced the increasingly
obsolete doctrine of landlord tort immunity with a duty on residential landlords
“to maintain the leased premises, including areas under the tenant’s exclusive
control or use, in a reasonably safe condition.”7
The Miller decision brings Oklahoma in line with the rest of the country, as
a majority of states have already abandoned caveat emptor.8  Miller is an
important step in protecting the rights of Oklahoma tenants; allowing tenants
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9. See Miller, ¶ 18, 212 P.3d at 1228 (noting that the current system of caveat emptor
“discourages repairs and rewards inattentive landlords”). 
10. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Modern Status of Landlord's Tort Liability for Injury
or Death of Tenant or Third Person Caused by Dangerous Condition of Premises, 64 A.L.R.3d
339, 341-43 (1975).
11. See Jean C. Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee,
Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 19, 31, 98.
12. See Shipley, supra note 10, at 346.
to recover for personal injuries caused by defective premises will encourage
landlords to make repairs and maintain the safety of the leased property.9
The Miller opinion left some important issues unresolved, however.  This
case note, after discussing the historical background of caveat emptor in the
United States and Oklahoma in Part II, as well as the specifics of the Miller
case in Part III, focuses on resolving those unaddressed issues surrounding the
new duty upon landlords.  Although the Miller court’s adoption of a duty of
reasonable care for residential landlords is strongly supported by public policy
concerns such as tenant expectations and fairness, Part IV.A discusses why the
court should have explained its adoption of a negligence standard as opposed
to a strict liability standard, especially when only strict liability would allow
tenants to recover in cases involving latent defects.  Part IV.B explains how
the Miller court could have more fully delineated the scope of the new
landlord duty of reasonableness, and used that opportunity to extend the scope
of the duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs.  Finally, Part IV.C shows that although
the holding in Miller is clearly restricted to residential leases, the policy
justifications behind its decision are also applicable to commercial leases,
suggesting that in the future commercial landlord tort immunity should also be
eliminated.  Part V offers a brief conclusion of these issues.  
II. Historical Background
From sixteenth-century England to the present day, landlord-tenant law
related to tort liability evolved greatly.10  The past century saw jurisdictions
move at various speeds away from the early common law doctrine of caveat
emptor, first adopting common law exceptions to landlord immunity, and later
developing statutory or implied warranties of habitability.11  A complete
abrogation of caveat emptor and its subsequent replacement with a duty of
reasonable care has been the latest step in the process.12
A. Caveat Emptor
The doctrine of caveat emptor has its roots in early property law; in
sixteenth-century England, when a person purchased land, it was his
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/4
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13. Love, supra note 11, at 27.
14. Id.
15. See Shipley, supra note 10, at 342 (noting that although term leases may have originally
been construed as contractual arrangements, during feudal times leases were treated as “a sale
of the exclusive possession and control of the land for the term”).
16. Love, supra note 11, at 26.
17. See Shipley, supra note 10, at 342.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT ch. 17, reporter’s note at 2
(1977).
19. Love, supra note 11, at 28.
20. Shipley, supra note 10, at 344.
21. See Love, supra note 11, at 28.
22. Id.
23. See id.
responsibility as buyer to inspect the property prior to purchase.13  Unless
buyer and seller made an express contract otherwise, the purchaser of real
property took the land “as is.”14
During this time period, the law treated a lease as a conveyance of an estate
in land.15  This made sense at the time, when leases primarily “involved the
transfer of land for agricultural purposes” and structures on the land “were of
secondary importance.”16  Treating a lease as akin to the sale of a time-limited
interest in land meant that caveat emptor remained in full force, leaving the
tenant responsible for any defects or inadequacies in the land.17
Traditionally, the landlord had no general duty to deliver to the tenant “a
physically safe and habitable leasehold.”18  Nor did the landlord have any
responsibility to repair or maintain the premises during the term of the lease.19
As a result, once the landlord delivered the premises, he was immune to tort
actions from tenants or third parties who were injured by defects in the
premises.20
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the doctrine of caveat emptor did not
place a particularly onerous burden on tenants.21  Using the land mostly for
agrarian purposes, a tenant was
capable of inspecting the real estate for defects prior to the
inception of the lease, for even if there were improvements on the
property, they were relatively simple in design. As for defects
arising during the term of the lease, [a tenant] probably had both
the skill and the financial resources to make the necessary repairs.22
As the world became increasingly urbanized, particularly in the twentieth
century, justifications behind the rule of caveat emptor weakened.23 Courts
moved away from the concept of residential leases as conveyances and toward
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24. Id. at 99.
25. Id. at 92.
26. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
27. Id. at 1078-79 (“[T]oday’s city dweller . . . is unable to make repairs like the ‘jack-of-
all-trades’ farmer who was the common law's model of lessee. . . . Low and middle income
tenants . . . would be unable to obtain any financing for major repairs since they have no long-
term interest in the property.”).
28. Id. at 1079.
29. See Shipley, supra note 10, at 344-46; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:
LANDLORD & TENANT ch. 17, reporter’s note at 2 (1977).
30. Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 531 (N.H. 1973).
a view of leases as contractual agreements.24  This was largely due to the fact
that courts began to view the modern residential lease as “an obligation to
provide a dwelling space and essential services” rather than as a transfer of
land.25  
When entering into a lease, residential tenants are now far more interested
in obtaining “adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing
facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper
maintenance” for their dwelling place than they are in obtaining the land
itself.26  Also, as building technologies have become more complex and
mechanical, it is increasingly unlikely that modern tenants possess the
requisite skills or financial ability to make repairs to defective premises
themselves.27
Ill-equipped either to uncover defects before taking possession or to repair
defects that arise after possession, modern tenants are forced to rely on their
landlords to ensure the safety of the premises.28  Unfortunately, continued
adherence to caveat emptor in many jurisdictions in the early twentieth century
meant that most landlords had no legal duty to protect their tenants against
personal injuries caused by the premises and could not be held liable for such
harm.
B. Common Law Exceptions to Caveat Emptor
The harshness of caveat emptor in light of modern apartment dwelling
encouraged the development of a number of exceptions to landlord tort
immunity that allowed tenants to recover for physical injuries under certain
circumstances.29  Generally, a landlord was liable for a tenant’s physical
injuries if the injury was caused by “(1) a hidden danger in the premises of
which the landlord but not the tenant is aware, (2) premises leased for public
use, (3) premises retained under the landlord’s control, such as common
stairways, or (4) premises negligently repaired by the landlord.”30  An
additional exception allowed recovery against a landlord for injuries caused
by “defects constituting a violation of a provision of the applicable building
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31. Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 755 (Ind. App. 1976).
32. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
33. See Shipley, supra note 10, at 346.
34. Id.
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 17.6 cmt. a (1977)
(“[T]his Restatement takes the position that there is an implied warranty of habitability by the
landlord in regard to residential property. . . . By analogy to the negligence per se doctrine,
when the landlord violates this duty, he becomes subject to liability for physical harm resulting
from such violation.”).
36. Love, supra note 11, at 101.
37. Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961).
38. Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969).
39. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
40. Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526 (N.J. 1970).
41. Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971).
42. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1972).
43. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
44. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973).
45. Green v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974).
46. Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1974).
47. Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265 (Mo.1984).
or housing code.”31  Another recent common law exception to landlord tort
immunity imposes a duty upon landlords to exercise reasonable care to protect
their tenants from foreseeable criminal activities.32
These common law exceptions to landlord tort immunity offered some
protection to tenants; however, if a tenant’s situation did not fit into one of the
specified exceptions, caveat emptor controlled, and the tenant could not
recover.33
C. Implied Warranty of Habitability and Statutory Reforms
Frustrated with the “inflexibility of the standard exceptions” to landlord tort
immunity, some courts looked to other options.34  The development of an
implied warranty of habitability applicable to residential leases was one
method advanced as a way to protect tenants injured by defective premises.35
An implied warranty of habitability “imposes a duty on the landlord to put the
premises in habitable condition at the inception of the lease and to maintain the
premises in such condition for the duration of the lease.”36  Jurisdictions that
have adopted an implied warranty of habitability by judicial decision include
Wisconsin,37 Hawaii,38 the District of Columbia,39 New Jersey,40 New
Hampshire,41 Illinois,42 Iowa,43 Massachusetts,44 California,45 Kansas,46 and
Missouri.47  Some jurisdictions have held that a breach of the warranty of
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48. See, e.g., Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976); Allen v.
Lee, 538 N.E.3d 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); see also Montanez v. Bagg, 510 N.E.2d 298
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
49. See Stephen J. Maddex, Note, Propst v. McNeill: Arkansas Landlord-Tenant Law, A
Time for Change, 51 ARK. L. REV. 575, 597-600 (1998).
50. Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 14, 86 P.3d 270, 277 (Wyo. 2004).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 17.6 (1977).
A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others
upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenants by a
dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken
possession, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and
the existence of the condition is in violation of: (1) an implied warranty of
habitability; or (2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation.
Id.
52. See Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (N.H. 1973) (noting that applying a negligence
standard of reasonableness to landlords “best expresses the principles of justice and
reasonableness upon which our law of torts is founded.”).
53. Shipley, supra note 10, at 346 (referencing Sargent, 308 A.2d 528).
54. 308 A.2d at 529-30.
habitability can form the basis for holding the landlord liable in tort for a
tenant’s personal injuries.48
Other states have chosen to adopt statutory reforms to landlord tenant law.49
Often, though not always, modeled on the Uniform Residential Landlord
Tenant Act, such legislation generally “require[s] landlords to maintain the
premises in a fit, safe and habitable condition.”50  Similar to a breach of an
implied warranty habitability, a landlord’s breach of a statutory duty could
result in tort liability for a tenant’s physical injuries.51
D. A Negligence Standard Emerges
Applying tort principles of negligence was another option taken by courts
interested in ridding themselves of caveat emptor.52  Beginning with Sargent
v. Ross in 1973, courts began to abandon common law caveat emptor
wholesale by officially requiring landlords to “exercise reasonable care not to
subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm . . . and act as a reasonable
person under all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others,
the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or
avoiding the risk.”53
Sargent involved the death of the tenant’s four-year-old child, who fell from
the apartment’s extremely steep stairway, which had been built by the
landlord.54  Because the stairway was under the sole control of the tenant, it
was not used in common by other tenants, and there was no evidence of a
latent defect, the defendant-landlord argued that he owed no tort duty to the
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55. Id. at 530.
56. Id. at 533.
57. Id. (noting that sovereign tort immunity, parental tort immunity, real estate vendor's
immunity, and marital tort immunity have been eroded in New Hampshire).
58. Id. at 534.
59. Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1994).
60. Stephens v. Stearns, 678 P.2d 41 (Idaho 1984).
61. Tighe v. Cedar Lawn, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002).
62. Turpel v. Sayles, 692 P.2d 1290 (Nev. 1985).
63. Anderson v. Sammy Redd & Assocs., 650 A.2d 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
64. Gourdi v. Berkelo, 1996-NMSC-076, 122 N.M. 675, 930 P.2d 812.
65. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985).
66. Favreau v. Miller, 591 A.2d 68 (Vt. 1991).
67. Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 284 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1979).
68. See Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 16, 86 P.3d 270, 278 (Wyo. 2004).
69. 1939 OK 19, ¶ 5, 86 P.2d 621, 622.
70. Id. ¶ 2, 86 P.2d at 622.
71. Id.
plaintiff.55  Rather than trying to fit this fact pattern into one of the recognized
common law exceptions to caveat emptor, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
found it “more realistic” to abandon the convoluted system of exceptions, and
completely reversed the old policy of residential landlord tort immunity.56
Recognizing that other immunities from tort liability had been on the decline,57
the court felt landlords deserved no special protections from the law, and
should be subject to a duty of reasonable care.58
States that followed Sargent’s lead in using a negligence standard for
landlords included Alaska,59 Idaho,60 Nebraska,61 Nevada,62 New Jersey,63 New
Mexico,64 Utah,65 Vermont,66 and Wisconsin.67  Tenants in these states became
free to recover in tort for personal injuries caused by the defective premises.
By 2004, more than forty states had adopted some form of judicial or
legislative reform to lessen the sting of caveat emptor.68
E. Caveat Emptor in Oklahoma
Caveat emptor has deep roots in Oklahoma, as the Oklahoma Supreme
Court acknowledged in Godbey v. Barton.69  In Godbey, a toddler drowned
after falling into a fifteen-foot deep, water-filled pit located near the house his
parents had leased.70  The plaintiff-parents admitted that they had first
discovered the pit, which was concealed from view by tall weeds, before the
accident.71  In ruling for the landlord, the court noted:
The cases are practically agreed that where the right of possession
and enjoyment of the leased premises passes to the lessee, in the
absence of concealment or fraud by the landlord as to some defect
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
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72. Id. ¶ 5, 86 P.2d at 622 (quoting J.E. O'B., Annotation, Who Is a Stranger or Third
Person Within the Rule Regarding Landlord's Liability to Stranger or Third Person Where
Premises Are in a Ruinous Condition or Condition Amounting to a Nuisance When Leased, 110
A.L.R. 756, 756 (1937)).
73. See Lavery v. Brigance, 1925 OK 702, ¶ 6, 242 P. 239, 241 (citing § 7370, Okla. Comp.
Stats. 1921); see also Marjorie Downing, The Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act--
The Continuing Experience, 17 TULSA L.J. 97, 100 n.18 (1981) (“The Oklahoma residential
landlord's obligation to maintain rental property has long been defined by statute.”).  The
current Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act can be found at 41 OKLA. STAT. §§
101-136 (2001).
74. See, e.g., Alfe v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 1937 OK 243, ¶ 10, 67 P.2d 947, 948; Staples v.
Baty, 1952 OK 98, ¶ 4, 242 P.2d 705, 706.
75. See Lavery, ¶¶ 7-8, 242 P. at 241. The notes in the  Restatement (Second) of Property
warn, “It would be disconcerting if the tenant who fell through the rotten floor of his kitchen
could withhold rent until the hole was repaired, but could not recover for the personal injury he
had sustained.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP. § 17.6 reporter's note at 8 (1977).  This was
essentially the state of the law in Oklahoma under Lavery and Godbey.
76. See Crane Co. v. Sears, 1934 OK 375, ¶ 28, 35 P.2d 916, 920, (referencing Horton v.
Early, 1913 OK 508, 134 P. 436) (“[W]here the landlord is under no obligation to make repairs,
but undertakes to make them gratuitously, he will be liable for his negligence in making such
repairs.”); see also Buck v. Miller, 1947 OK 172, 181 P.2d 264.
in the premises known to him and unknown to the tenant, the rule
of caveat emptor applies and the tenant takes the premises in
whatever condition they may be in, thus assuming all risk of
personal injury from defects therein.72
Although Oklahoma adhered to caveat emptor under the common law, the
state was an early adopter of landlord-tenant statutory reforms. In 1921,
Oklahoma adopted statutory requirements regulating the duties of residential
landlords that required landlords to make the premises fit for occupation and
repair any defects not caused by the tenant’s own negligence.73
Even with statutory reforms, Oklahoma landlords remained immune from
tort suits.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court made it clear early on that the
statutory provisions provided no remedy for recovery for personal injuries
caused by poorly maintained or defective premises;74 recovery was restricted
to statutory remedies that allowed the tenant to recover the cost of repairs to
the premises by withholding rent, or to vacate the premises.75
Because Oklahoma’s statutes offered no relief to tenants who suffered
personal injuries, plaintiffs turned to common law exceptions to caveat emptor.
In Oklahoma, a tenant-plaintiff could recover for personal injuries caused by
a landlord’s negligent repairs, because landlords who undertake to make
repairs must do so in a reasonably safe manner.76  Since 1950, Oklahoma
landlords also have had a duty to exercise reasonable care to safely maintain
common areas such as entryways, stairs, and porches that are used by multiple
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/4
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77. See Arnold v. Walters, 1950 OK 198, ¶ 14, 224 P.2d 261, 263 (quoting 32 AM. JUR.
Landlord & Tenant § 688 (1941)); see also Geesing v. Pendergrass, 1966 OK 149, 417 P.2d
322.
78. Lay v. Dworman, 1986 OK 85, ¶ 9, 732 P.2d 455, 458.
79. See Cordes v. Wood, 1996 OK 68, ¶ 11, 918 P.2d 76, 78-79 (noting that one of “the
cornerstones of this duty” is “exclusivity of control”).
80. Id. ¶ 16, 918 P.2d at 80.
81. 464 S.E.2d 39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
82. Id. at 40.
83. See id.
84. Cordes, ¶ 16, 918 P.2d at 80.
85. See, e.g., Lavery v. Brigance, 1925 OK 702, ¶ 9, 242 P. 239, 241.  The plaintiff in
Lavery was injured in a gas explosion caused by the landlord’s failure to seal a hole in the gas
pipe.  Id.  Ruling in favor of the landlord under caveat emptor, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
commented:
[W]e cannot doubt that this plaintiff has been badly injured.  Yet, however
strongly her plight may appeal to our sympathies, we must not lose sight of the
fact that ‘hard cases make bad law,’ and allow ourselves to be governed
accordingly.  However deserving of relief this plaintiff may be, we must conclude
that, as to these defendants, she must bear her injuries uncompensated. 
tenants, or by both tenants and the landlord, because these common areas were
deemed to be under the control of the landlord, rather than the tenant.77  In
1986, this duty to maintain common areas was expanded to require residential
landlords to maintain the common parts of the property “in such a manner as
to insure that the likelihood of criminal activity is not unreasonably enhanced
by the condition of those common premises.”78
As a result of these latter two exceptions to landlord tort immunity, a case
often depended greatly on who had control of the defective premises.79  If the
landlord lacked control over the defect, the landlord would not be liable.80  For
example, in Cordes v. Wood, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited approvingly
Plott v. Cloer,81 a Georgia Court of Appeals decision.  In Plott, the tenant-
plaintiff was sexually assaulted after an assailant climbed into her duplex's
second-story window, which the tenant had left open.82  In the tenant’s suit
against the landlord for failing to maintain the safety of the premises, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held the landlord had relinquished complete control
of the premises to the tenant and thus the landlord was not liable for her
injuries.83
As a result of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Cordes, if a defect
causing personal injuries was located in a part of the premises over which the
tenant had exclusive control and was not caused by the landlord’s negligent
repairs, no exception to caveat emptor applied.84  The landlord remained
immune from suit, no matter how horribly injured the plaintiff was as a result
of the landlord’s neglect.85  The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s holding in Miller
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Id.
86. Miller v. David Grace, Inc., 2009 OK 49, ¶ 2, 212 P.3d 1223, 1226.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. ¶ 3, 212 P.3d at 1226.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. ¶ 4, 212 P.3d at 1226.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. ¶ 5, 212 P.3d at 1226.
96. Id. ¶ 6, 212 P.3d at 1226.
completely changed this reliance on strict common law exceptions.
III. Miller v. David Grace, Inc.
A. Facts and Procedure
Lora Ann Miller moved into a second-floor unit at River Chase Apartments,
owned and operated by First Choice Management (the landlord), on July 29,
2002.86  The apartment included a wooden balcony with a metal railing.87
While inspecting the unit as instructed by the landlord, Ms. Miller discovered
the railing on the balcony was loose.88  Twice, Ms.  Miller informed the
apartment manager about the loose railing, but no repairs were completed,
despite the manager allegedly promising something would be done.89  Ms.
Miller later testified that she feared someone might fall because of the loose
railing, which she believed was dangerous due to a missing screw.90  
The problem with the balcony was even more severe than she knew: the
opposite side of the railing was missing several screws, and the floor was
cracked where the balcony was supposed to be attached to the deck.91  On
August 18, 2002, Ms. Miller was standing on the balcony; as she leaned
forward with her hand on the railing, the entire railing collapsed.92  Both the
railing and Ms. Miller fell from the second floor to the ground.93  Ms. Miller
suffered multiple injuries from the fall.94 
Eleven months before this incident, the landlord had hired David Grace, Inc.
(the contractor) to bring all the apartments’ balconies up to code; the
contractor claimed it was never notified of issues regarding the repairs.95
Ms. Miller filed suit against both the landlord and the contractor, alleging
that the landlord “owed her a duty to repair the defective railing,” and the
contractor owed her “a duty to construct and install a safe balcony railing.”96
The landlord and contractor each moved separately for summary judgment,
alleging no duty was owed to Ms. Miller under Godbey v. Barton and that the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/4
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97. Id. ¶ 7, 212 P.3d at 1226.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 9, 212 P.3d at 1226.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶ 24, 212 P.3d at 1230.
103. Id. ¶ 33, 212 P.3d at 1232.
104. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 212 P.3d at 1227.
105. Id. ¶ 12, 212 P.3d at 1227.
balcony “was an open and obvious condition.”97  The landlord also maintained
that Ms. Miller retained “exclusive” control of the balcony.98  The trial court
granted summary judgment to both defendants without explanation.99  
Ms. Miller appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary
judgment for the landlord, but reversed as to David Grace, Inc. “because [Ms.
Miller's] negligence action stem[med] from an improperly installed railing, not
from [the] Contractor’s alleged duty to warn her of the defective condition.”100
On certiorari, Ms. Miller urged the Oklahoma Supreme Court to overrule
Godbey and impose upon residential landlords a duty of reasonable care.101
B. The Court's Opinion
In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Colbert, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to residential leases will no
longer be followed by this state, and that it is replaced by “a general duty of
care upon landlords to maintain the leased premises, including areas under the
tenant's exclusive control or use, in a reasonably safe condition.”102  Because
there was a material dispute of fact as to whether the landlord breached its duty
of care and whether the balcony railing was an open and obvious danger, the
court reversed the earlier summary judgments and remanded the case for
further proceedings.103
The court began by noting that it would employ a de novo standard of
review, as summary judgment and the existence of a legal duty are both
questions of law.104  Moving into its analysis of the case, the court considered
Miller’s first argument, that section 118 of the Oklahoma Landlord Tenant Act
had eliminated the common law doctrine of caveat emptor.105  The court
quickly dispensed with that theory, pointing out that although the Landlord
Tenant Act
imposes a duty upon the landlord to “[m]ake all repairs and do
whatever is necessary to put and keep the tenant’s dwelling unit
and premises in a fit and habitable condition,” it does not create a
tort remedy for personal injuries sustained as a result of a
landlord’s breach of those duties.  It merely regulates the
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contractual rights and obligations of the residential parties and does
not enlarge the landlord’s duty under common law.106
Having established that the Oklahoma Landlord Tenant Act offered no
relief to the plaintiff, the court then turned to the question of whether the
landlord and contractor owed a duty of care to Miller under the common
law.107  The landlord and contractor argued that Godbey v. Barton precluded
recovery by Miller in tort.108  The court acknowledged that caveat emptor was
the current law in Oklahoma for landlord tort liability:
[T]he right of possession and enjoyment of the leased premises
passes to the lessee, in the absence of concealment or fraud by the
landlord as to some defect in the premises known to him and
unknown to the tenant, the rule of caveat emptor applies and the
tenant takes the premises in whatever condition they may be in,
thus assuming all risk of personal injury from defects therein.109
Noting that Oklahoma has adopted a number of exceptions to caveat emptor
over the years,110 the court commented that a landlord could be held liable for
negligent repairs,111 failing to maintain common areas under his control,112 or
when his acts or omissions enabled a third party to commit criminal acts upon
a tenant.113  If, however, a tenant could not manage to fit his case into one of
these narrow exceptions to caveat emptor, he could not recover for personal
injuries caused by a neglectful landlord.114  The court admitted that the status
quo in Oklahoma “discourages repairs and rewards inattentive landlords with
immunity from suit while impeding a tenant’s recovery for a landlord's utter
disregard for a tenant’s health, safety, and welfare.”115
The court then turned its attention to other jurisdictions, noting that many
had abrogated caveat emptor as applied to residential leases.116  In particular,
the court focused on Young v. Garwacki,117 in which the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts adopted a duty of reasonableness for residential
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landlords.118  Prior to Young, landlords in Massachusetts had no duty to safely
maintain premises unless there was a separate covenant to do so; landlords
were also not legally responsible for existing defects unless the landlord had
failed to warn about hidden problems.119
After repeatedly referring to the rule as “archaic,” the Oklahoma Supreme
Court officially overruled Godbey and abandoned caveat emptor in favor of a
reasonableness standard similar to that articulated in Young.120  The court was
careful to note that this new duty of care hinges on the landlord’s knowledge
of the defect.121  Ultimately, the landlord now has a duty “to act reasonably
when the landlord knew or reasonably should have known of the defective
condition and had a reasonable opportunity to make repairs.”122
Returning to the facts of the Miller case, the court concluded that it was
clear “that [the] Landlord knew or should have known that the balcony railing
was unsafe,” in light of the undisputed testimony that Ms. Miller had informed
the apartment manager about the loose railing.123  “Upon [Ms. Miller’s] notice
to Landlord of the dangerous condition, Landlord had a duty to exercise
reasonable care to restore [her] balcony to a safe condition.”124
Turning next to the defendants’ “open and obvious” argument, the court
recited the familiar rule that there is no duty to protect others “from dangers
so ‘open and obvious’ as to reasonably expect others to detect them for
themselves.”125  There is, however, still a duty “‘to warn others of any hidden
dangers, traps, snares, pitfalls, and the like.’”126  Here, there was evidence of
hidden defects in the balcony and railing that were not known to Ms. Miller.127
The court noted “[t]hese latent defects present material issues of fact which
preclude summary judgment” and are relevant to the question of “whether the
dangerous condition was open and obvious” to Ms. Miller.128  The court ruled
that whether a danger was open and obvious to Ms. Miller was a question of
fact for the jury, and the trial court erred in granting judgment to the landlord
and contractor without the jury's consideration.129
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Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Civil
Appeals that the contractor mistakenly relied on an argument that no duty was
owed to Ms. Miller because of the railing’s open and obvious condition.130
The court pointed out that Ms. Miller’s claim against the contractor derives
“from [the] Contractor’s failure to construct and install a safe balcony railing,
not [the] Contractor’s failure to warn of a hazardous condition,” and therefore
the contractor is not entitled “to a ‘no duty’ defense based on an open and
obvious danger.”131
IV. Analysis: What the Court Left Out of Miller
Miller was a decisive victory for residential tenants in Oklahoma.  Allowing
tenants to recover for personal injuries encourages safety and responsibility on
the part of landlords; however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court left a few issues
unaddressed in the Miller opinion that may affect the case’s legacy.
A. Strict Liability Ignored?
In Miller, the court imposed a duty to act reasonably in maintaining leased
premises in a safe condition, giving tenants a cause of action based in
negligence if they were injured by a defect.132  Apart from a brief comment
that “today’s pronouncement does not make the landlord an insurer of the
tenant’s safety,” the court did not have much to say about alternatives to a
negligence standard for a landlord’s actions.133  The court should have more
fully explained the reasoning behind its choice to adopt a negligence-based
standard as opposed to imposing a strict liability on landlords who fail to
maintain the premises.
Historically, strict liability has most often been applied to situations where
society requires defendants to compensate victims for harm caused by the
inherent and abnormal risks in the defendants’ activities, which “are not of
themselves considered blameworthy” and may even be considered desirable.134
Strict liability is commonly applied to products manufacturers who are liable
in tort for any injury resulting from a defect in their product.135  Unlike a
negligence cause of action, which requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant “had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect that caused the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/4
2011] NOTES 375
136. Id. at 642.
137. See Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d 116, 119, 122 (Cal. 1985) (citing Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964) (“[A]ll those who are part of the ‘overall producing
and marketing enterprise . . . should bear the cost of injuries from defective products’”;
“[L]andlords are part of the ‘overall producing and marketing enterprise’ that makes housing
accommodations available to renters.”), overruled by Peterson v. Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905
(Cal. 1995).
138. See Love, supra note 11, at 134.
139. See id.
140. See 698 P.2d at 124.
141. Id. at 122-23.
142. 899 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1995).
143. Id. at 912.
injury,” a strict liability action does not demand the defendant have notice of
the defect.136
Proponents of a strict liability standard for landlords argue that renting
residential premises to tenants is akin to products manufacturers making and
distributing their products to consumers, as both landlords and manufacturers
are putting their “product” into the stream of commerce to be used by
unsuspecting “consumers.”137  Those in favor of strict liability for landlords
note that landlords are more familiar with the premises than their tenants are,
and can more easily uncover defects on the property.138  This is similar to a
primary rationale behind products liability; namely that the manufacturer of
a product is more familiar with its potential defects than consumers are,
putting the manufacturer in a better position to guard against the product’s
dangers.139
In 1985, the California Supreme Court used the products liability analogy
in Becker v. IRM Corp. to hold a residential landlord strictly liable for a
tenant’s injuries caused by a defective glass shower door in the apartment’s
bathroom.140  The Becker Court noted that it was fair to extend strict liability
to landlords because it is the landlord rather than the tenant who is better
equipped to inspect the premises or make repairs, and the landlord is more
financially able to bear the costs of injuries resulting from defects.141
California’s experiment with strict liability for landlords was a failed one:
Becker was overruled by Peterson v. Superior Court in 1995.142  California
reverted back to using a negligence standard for landlord tort liability,
commenting that “the decision in Becker went far beyond holding landlords
liable for injuries caused by their own fault, and imposed liability for injuries
caused by defects that the landlord had not created, that would not have been
disclosed by a reasonable inspection, and of which the landlord had no
knowledge.”143
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The Peterson court also noted that the application of strict liability to
landlord-tenant law had received a “chilly reception,” with the few
jurisdictions that addressed the Becker holding rejecting it outright.144  No
other state has judicially adopted a strict liability standard for landlords; they
have preferred instead to impose a duty of reasonable care which requires that
the landlord knew or should have known about the defect.145
Oklahoma also adopted a negligence standard rather than strict liability for
landlords in Miller.146  The court offered few reasons behind its decision.  It
stressed the importance of the landlord’s knowledge of the defect as a
precursor to liability, yet did not explain—as the Peterson court did in
California—why the landlord’s knowledge of the defect ensures fairness in
imposing liability on him.147  The court addressed none of the benefits of strict
liability—the landlord is in better position to repair, the landlord is better able
to financially bear the burden of liability, strict liability is easier to prove than
negligence—but chose instead to ignore the issue completely.
The court also should have explained why it felt fault liability was better
equipped to deal with situations such as latent defects which are
undiscoverable to both the landlord and the tenant.  Under a negligence
standard, if the defect is undiscoverable by the landlord, meaning he did not
and reasonably could not have known about it, it is the tenant who must bear
the burden of his loss, because in this situation, no duty is imposed on the
landlord.148  Under strict liability, however, the tenant could recover even if the
defect was undiscoverable by the landlord.  Is adhering to a negligence
standard in cases of latent defects fair when the landlord has the option of
buying liability insurance to spread the costs of his risk whereas the tenant
must rely solely on his own savings and personal health insurance to pay for
his injuries?149
Some have speculated that imposing strict liability would result in fewer
housing options available to low income tenants because landlords would
leave the market rather than face the increased possibility of successful
lawsuits over defective premises.150  The risk of the housing market contracting
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than the risk of that outcome occurring in jurisdictions that have adopted other
landlord-tenant reforms such as the implied warranty of habitability.151  Low
income tenants who lack insurance are also those who would benefit most
from a strict liability standard imposed on defective premises.152
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not address the cost considerations
behind strict liability in general, nor did it consider the option of imposing
strict liability only in the limited circumstance of latent defects.  While in
many cases a negligence standard is sufficient to allow an injured tenant to
recover, the court should have addressed more fully other potential options
such as strict liability, or at least discussed why a negligence standard was
preferable.
B. To Whom Do Landlords Owe the Duty of Reasonable Care?
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court imposed upon landlords a duty to
use reasonable care in maintaining their premises, it left open-ended the
question of to whom that duty is owed.153  In its opinion, the court discusses
at length the Massachusetts case Young v. Garwacki, the holding of which
focused on extending a landlord’s duty of reasonable care to the guest of a
tenant, not the tenant herself.154  The facts of Miller differ from Young in that
in the Oklahoma case, it was the tenant who was injured by the landlord’s
negligence rather than a visitor.155
Because the Miller fact pattern involved a tenant who clearly had the right
to be on the leased property, the court did not address whether a non-tenant
plaintiff injured on the premises would have a cause of action against the
landlord.  It would have been beneficial for future suits had the court taken the
initiative to preemptively define the group of plaintiffs to whom the landlord
owes the duty of reasonable care.  Rather than adhering to the outdated
distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassers, landlord tort liability
in Oklahoma should extend to all foreseeable plaintiffs who are injured by the
premises.
In Oklahoma, “it is well-settled . . . that the duty of care which an owner .
. . of land has toward one who comes upon his or her land and is injured
because of the condition of the premises, varies with the status occupied by the
entrant.”156  The different common law statuses recognized include trespassers,
who enter another’s land without the owner’s permission; licensees, who enter
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another’s land for their own benefit or pleasure with the permission of the
owner; and invitees, who enter another’s land with the owner’s permission for
the purpose of a common interest between the visitor and the owner.157
Landowners owe trespassers a duty to avoid injuring them “willfully or
wantonly.”158  Licensees are owed “a duty to exercise reasonable care to
disclose . . . the existence of dangerous defects known to the owner, but
unlikely to be discovered by the licensee,” meaning the property owner must
warn the licensee of hidden dangers on the property.159  Landowners owe the
highest duty to invitees; the owner must exercise “reasonable care to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition for the reception of the visitor.”160
Landowners have no duty to protect any class of entrants from open and
obvious dangers on the property.161
In light of the holding in Miller, these distinctions are outdated and should
not affect a landlord’s duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the
premises.  This is primarily due to practical concerns derived from the
distinction between invitees and licensees.  
In Oklahoma, most social guests are considered licensees because they are
coming onto the land primarily for their own benefit, such as a free meal or
social visit.162  “For an entrant to become an invitee, some public or business
purpose must predominate, rather than a purpose of providing companionship
or having social relations.”163  If social guests of tenants are considered
licensees, they would not be entitled to the full duty of reasonableness
articulated in Miller; instead of having a duty to maintain the premises in a
reasonably safe condition as for an invitee, landlords would only be required
to warn guests of hidden dangers rather than repair the defects.
A 1959 case, Pruitt v. Timme, appears to resolve this conflict by treating the
plaintiff, a social guest of one of the tenants, as an invitee of landlord.164  The
facts of this case are rather sparse, and it is not clear why the plaintiff was
considered an invitee of the landlord, or if her visit had some sort of business
purpose that benefited the landlord so as to take her out of the licensee
category and into that of an invitee.165
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss2/4
2011] NOTES 379
house may be an invitee as to the landlord of that house since the premises on which the
‘apartment business’ is maintained are presumably open for the purpose of such visits.”).
166. Love, supra note 11, at 123.
167. Id.
168. Cordes v. Wood, 1996 OK 68, ¶ 11, 918 P.2d 76, 78-79.
169. Id. ¶ 12, 918 P.2d at 79.
170. Love, supra note 11, at 123.
171. See Miller v. David Grace, Inc., 2009 OK 49, ¶ 19, 212 P.3d 1223, 1228 (“Oklahoma’s
adherence to the caveat emptor doctrine obscures rather than illuminates the proper
considerations which govern a court’s determination of a residential landlord’s duty.”).
172. Id. ¶ 18, 212 P.3d at 1228.
A better solution would be to extend the landlord’s duty to exercise
reasonable care to all foreseeable plaintiffs.  Such a system would be more
flexible than rigid status-based classes of eligible plaintiffs.166  It would “shift[]
the focus of the judicial inquiry from the technical classification of the
plaintiff’s status to the more appropriate question of whether there was a
foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff.”167
Determining whether a particular plaintiff was under a foreseeable risk of
harm would not be terribly taxing for courts to decide.  In earlier cases dealing
with common law exceptions to caveat emptor, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
acknowledged that foreseeability was a “cornerstone” of a landlord’s duty to
reasonably protect tenants from criminal attacks.168  If the court is equipped to
determine whether a “criminal act which resulted in injury to [tenant]” was the
kind of event a landlord “could reasonably be expected to prevent,” then the
court should be able to determine whether the plaintiff was someone the
landlord could reasonably expect to be injured by a particular act.169
Assuming the court found the plaintiff to be subject to a foreseeable risk of
harm, any plaintiff could recover, regardless of their status as an invitee,
licensee, or trespasser.  The plaintiff’s status might be considered as a factor,170
but would no longer be entirely dispositive of the issue.  Lessening the
influence of the old common law entrant statuses would help deserving (i.e.,
foreseeable) plaintiffs recover from neglectful landlords.
C. Should Landlord Tort Immunity Also Be Eliminated From Commercial
Leases?
In Miller, the court clearly restricts its holding to residential landlords.171
The ruling is supported largely by concerns such as reasonableness and a
desire to protect tenants from “a landlord’s utter disregard for a tenant’s health,
safety, and welfare.”172  Because these concerns are equally applicable to
commercial leases, the duty of reasonable care to maintain the premises in a
safe manner that was articulated in Miller should also be imposed on
commercial landlords.
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Because residential tenants usually have far less bargaining power than their
landlords, landlord-tenant law reforms have often focused more on protections
for residential tenants.173  Commercial tenants are seen as more sophisticated
and better able than their residential counterparts to either properly inspect the
premises or bargain for better terms with their landlord.174  As a result, reforms
to commercial landlord-tenant law have somewhat lagged behind reforms
affecting residential leases, noticeably in the area of landlord tort liability for
personal injuries.
In Miller, the court extensively and approvingly reviewed the Young v.
Garwacki decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, wherein
Massachusetts adopted a duty for landlords to exercise reasonable care in
maintaining leased residential premises.175  The Oklahoma Supreme Court
praised the Massachusetts court's decision to abandon the “archaic” rule of
caveat emptor in regards to residential leases.176  Massachusetts retains that
archaic rule when it comes to commercial leases, though it does recognize two
common law exceptions to liability.177
In the Massachusetts case Humphrey v. Byron, the plaintiff was the sole
employee of a small silkscreen printing company which had leased a building,
including the basement.178  The plaintiff was injured in a fall down the
basement stairs, which lacked a railing and were described as wobbly.179  If the
plaintiff in Humphrey had been a residential tenant leasing an apartment in that
building, he would have been entitled to recover under Young; however,
because the plaintiff was a commercial tenant who could not fit his cause of
action into the recognized common law exceptions, he was denied recovery.180
Under Miller, the result would be same if this case occurred in Oklahoma;
a residential tenant could recover whereas a commercial tenant could not.  The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has acknowledged that “differentiation between
commercial and residential tenants” can be justified in order to give “the
residential tenant protections which are not particularly needed by commercial
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tenants.”181  It is not necessarily true, however, that commercial tenants do not
need the same duty of reasonableness to maintain safe premises imposed on
their landlords as residential tenants do.
As the plaintiff tried to argue in Humphrey, not all commercial tenants are
sophisticated bargainers with the ability to knowledgably inspect the premises
for defects; tenants that are small businesses may have “a short-term lease,
limited funds, and limited experience dealing with such defects.”182  When
commercial tenants—regardless of size—inspect their premises, they are
usually looking for “space requirements, adequate location, parking, and other
conditions related to conducting a profitable business,” rather than structural
defects that might harm them or their customers.183  Small business owners in
particular are unlikely to be able to afford inspectors to search for defects or
legal counsel to help negotiate more favorable terms in the lease.184
In Miller, the court commented, “The expectation that a landlord act
reasonably is inherent in contemporary residential leases.”185  This expectation
is also inherent in modern commercial leases, particularly those involving
small businesses that are not equipped to inspect the premises themselves.
Even large businesses expect their landlord to act reasonably in maintaining
the premises.  Landlords should not be allowed to disregard the “health, safety,
and welfare” of those who use their premises merely because the tenant is
commercial rather than residential.  Adhering to caveat emptor for commercial
leases requires the tenant to bear the burden of the landlord’s negligence, even
where the landlord acts unreasonably.  Commercial tenants should be given the
same protections of reasonableness regarding landlord tort liability as
residential tenants.
V. Conclusion
With the holding in Miller v. David Grace, Inc., Oklahoma has joined the
majority of states in protecting the right of residential tenants to recover from
negligent landlords.  The court's decision recognized that the nature of
residential leases has changed greatly since the common law doctrine of caveat
emptor first emerged in agrarian England.  By adopting a negligence standard,
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the court eliminated the confusion and rigidity that accompanied the prior
system of common law exceptions to landlord tort immunity.
While it is now clear that residential landlords are under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to maintain the leased premises, the Miller opinion should
have explained more fully why the court chose to adopt a negligence standard
rather than imposing strict liability on landlords.  Strict liability may even have
been the better decision for Oklahoma tenants under limited circumstances
related to latent defects.
The court also should have better defined the field of persons to whom the
duty of reasonable care is owed.  Under Oklahoma's current recognition of
different statuses of entrants on land, the scope of the landlord’s duty to the
plaintiff depends on whether the plaintiff is a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.
The court should have taken the opportunity in Miller, as the Massachusetts
court did in Young, to extend the duty of care to those plaintiffs under a
foreseeable risk of harm from the defective premises.
Finally, the holding in Miller should be extended not only to residential
landlords, but also to commercial landlords.  In contemporary commercial
leases, tenants—especially small businesses—are not always able to
adequately inspect the premises or negotiate more satisfactory terms, due to a
lack of financial or technical ability.  If a fault-based standard such as the duty
of reasonableness imposed on residential landlords is extended to commercial
leases, commercial landlords could justly be held accountable for failing to
adequately maintain or repair the premises in line with the tenant’s
expectations.  
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